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Building on the classical literature of the public, the article critically analyses the current literature 
on global governance. After briefly presenting the classical understanding of the public the author 
goes on to argue that in global governance the effectiveness of collective problem-solving is seen 
as a compensation for its lack of inclusiveness which in turn makes it impossible to equate global 
governance with (transnational) public. The author criticizes the substitution of the term “the 
public” by “stakeholders” since the notion of stakeholders allows for economically powerful 
voices to intervene in public decision-making processes. The article furthermore criticizes ideas on 
global governance as “strong publics” on the basis that even if the decision-making seen in global 
governance was to follow the ideal of rational deliberation, this would not make it equal to the 
transnational publics, since the deliberations of transnational “strong publics” are per definition 
exclusive in nature.
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Introduction
In recent years, a new term has been coined to refer to the regulation 
of transnational public affairs: global governance. Finkelstein (1995: 369) 
defines global governance as governing - without sovereign authority 
- relationships that transcend national frontiers. Similarly, according to 
Dryzek (2000: 120), global governance is “the creation and maintenance 
of order and the resolution of joint problems in the absence of such 
binding decision structures”. The Commission on Global Governance 
describes global governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals 
and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs” (Report 
of the Commission on Global Governance 1995: 1)1. Global governance 
is thus presented as a process in which there is no central authority that 
would make binding decisions upon the global polity, yet the global 
community finds ways to resolve common problems. Such claims for 
global governance come very close to Dewey’s classical understanding 
(1927/1954) of an organised public – a process in which members of the 
public come together in order to regulate public affairs. 
This article critically analyses such optimistic, positive accounts of 
global governance. Specifically, we analyse four explicit statements in 
current scholarship on global governance that evoke the idea that a 
transnational public should be sought within the developing processes of 
global governance: 
a. in global governance, decision-making processes follow rational, 
deliberative practices (e.g. Lynch 2000, Eriksen and Fossum 2001, 
Kapoor 2005, Mitzen 2005); 
b. global governance represents the transnational public sphere since 
it involves inclusive, deliberative consultations (e.g. Dryzek 1996, 
Nanz and Steffek 2004, Eckersley 2007);
1 It is important to note here that this article does not address all understandings of governance theory, but only 
those that (a) address global or transnational governance and (b) extend governance from a private affair into a 
public affair. The private here means that the subjects are understood as owners who regulate their property, as 
for example in the case of Carver’s conceptualisation of board governance theory which addresses “the direct 
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c. global governance is an inclusive phenomenon since it includes 
stakeholders (e.g. Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004, Bäckstrand 
2006, MacDonald 2008);
d. global governance is the process whereby transnational public is-
sues are regulated and the effectiveness of this regulation provides 
it with legitimacy (e.g. Bäckstrand 2006).
By critically responding to these statements, we juxtapose the current 
literature on global governance with the classical literature on the public. 
The article is divided into five sections. In the first section we will present a 
classical, normative understanding of the public as a democratic ideal. 
Each of the following sections deals critically with one of the four statements 
presented above: (a) global governance as rational deliberation, (b) as 
deliberative consultation, (c) as including stakeholders, (d) as a process in 
which its effectiveness constitutes its legitimacy.
The public in its classical understanding
The public in its classical understanding was not understood to be solely 
a national phenomenon. Kant (1795/1957) proposed that publicity should 
extend national borders and serve the cause of world peace. A good 
century later, World War I led Tönnies (1922/1998: 433-444) and Dewey 
(1927/1954) to express similar sentiments. Tarde conceptualised the 
public as being composed around the printing press, and proposed that 
journalism has not only nationalised but also internationalised the “public 
mind” (Tarde 1989/1969: 303-304). Blumer (1946/1953: 46) specifically 
stressed that the public is not necessarily the same as the citizenry of a 
nation-state, since its outer boundaries are defined by the issue at hand. 
In criticising current literature on global governance, I build primarily 
on this classical literature about the public, drawing on writings from 
the European Enlightenment in the 18th century (Kant 1784, 1795/1957, 
Bentham 1791/1843, Mill 1832), as well as early 20th-century German 
(Tönnies 1922/1988) and American thinking about the public (e.g. Dewey 
1927/1954, Park 1924/2007, Mills 1956, Blumer 1946/1953).
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This tradition conceives of the public as a democratic ideal with four 
dimensions: structural conditions, process, content, and efficacy. The first 
refers to the conditions under which the public is formed, the second to 
the conditions to which members of the public adhere while deliberating, 
the third to what the public is deliberating about and the fourth to the 
results of its deliberation.
(a) Structure: The public is a group of people who are confronted by a 
potentially public issue, are divided by their ideas as to how to address 
the issue and proceed to engage in deliberation (Blumer 1946/1953: 46). 
All those who are potentially affected are able to participate as peers in 
deliberations concerning the organisation of their common affairs (Fraser 
2007: 20). The public is autonomous from and serves as a public check 
on public powers in authority (Bentham 1791/1843). Institutional authority, 
with its sanctions and controls, does not, therefore, penetrate the public 
(Mills 1956: 304). Nor could power and money influence its deliberation 
(Habermas 1996: 364). Finally, the information that members of the public 
need in order to become aware of some potential public problem and 
make the best decision possible is publicly accessible (in analogy with 
Bentham 1791/1843: n.p. Splichal 2002: 168, Gastil 2008: 20). 
(b) Process: The public’s deliberation proceeds in such a way that in the 
public as many people express opinions as receive them and everyone 
has the opportunity to respond to an opinion without internal or external 
reprisals being taken (Mills 1956: 302–304). Deliberators provide mutually 
justifiable reasons for their assertions (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 129).
The authority of deliberators is built purely upon their deliberative proposals 
and not outside sources of power (Cohen 1989: 21). Every member of 
the public can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions and offer 
reasons in support or criticism of proposals (Cohen 1989: 21). Deliberators 
acknowledge the value and dignity of all human beings - those with 
whom they deliberate (“politeness” as suggested by Papacharissi (2004: 
262) and also others who are not participating in deliberation (“civility” as 
suggested by Papacharissi (2004: 267). Nothing is to be taken for granted; 
everything could be subject to argument and evidence (Carey 1995: 381). 
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(c) Content: Deliberators deliberate whether an issue is a matter of public 
affairs in that its potential consequences are extensive, long-term and 
serious (Dewey 1927/1954: 126-128). Members of the public thus realise 
how personal troubles relate to social problems and, conversely, how 
the community’s problems are relevant to its members (Mills 1956: 318). 
Second, members of the public deliberate whether an issue is outside the 
realm of necessity, or, in other words, whether it is possible to make the 
social changes the issue calls for, where the public is the primary agent in 
the process of politicisation  (Gamble 2000/2006: 7, Hay 2007: 79)2.
(d) Effectiveness: The first important result of public deliberation is 
that participants “hear the other side” and know the opinions of other 
deliberators and understand their reasons for holding these opinions 
(Mansbridge 1983: 78, Graham 2008: 30). Furthermore, deliberators come 
to a common decision or they agree to disagree but continue to seek 
fair terms of cooperation among equals (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 
53). The opinion of the public is finally effective in the shaping of decisions 
with powerful consequences (Mills 1956: 302–304, Fraser 2007: 22), either 
by influencing the majority opinion or by influencing the assessment of 
public opinion that those in power take into account in the decision-
making process (Splichal 1999: 4). Public officials are representatives of 
the public and are accountable to the public so that the interests of the 
public are preserved and protected (Dewey 1927/1954: 15-16). Finally, 
public powers are able to implement public decisions (Fraser 2007: 22).
Classical thought on the public has been disrupted by the English 
translation of Habermas’s (1962/1989) work on Öffentlichkeit3 as “the 
public sphere”, resulting in what Splichal (2010) terms the “eclipse of the 
public” in scholarly thought. Here, the term “public” refers to the agency 
of public deliberation - basically to the question of who deliberates. The 
public sphere refers to the question of conditions of deliberation. It is, 
however, difficult if not impossible to divide the normative conditions of 
2 Gamble (2000/2006) sees the realm of the political narrowing, with diminished powers to imagine any alternatives 
to the current social position and the perception of social affairs as being subject to the influence of fate. The end 
of history, the end of the nation-state, the end of government and the end of the public sphere are presented as 
consequences of fate, as the end of the endeavour of humans to take their future in their own hands, according to 
Gamble. These modern “endisms” furnish visions of society in which people are seen as being held captive by the 
forces of modernity, trapped in the iron cages of the modern world: bureaucracy, technology and the global market 
(Gamble 2000/2006: 18).
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public deliberation so that each would separately belong to either the 
public or the public sphere— which is probably why the public sphere and 
the public are nowadays used in a simultaneous and inconsistent fashion 
(see for example Fraser 1992). The ultimate defining characteristic of the 
public sphere is whether it actually serves the organisation of the public. 
The public is, by definition—to borrow Darnton’s (2000: n.p.) words—“an 
active agent in history, an actual force that produces actual effects.” 
The public sphere by itself, Darnton (2000: n.p.) continues, could not be 
ascribed with any such agency. 
Rational deliberation on its own does not constitute 
the public
There are a number of authors who identify the international public sphere 
with the rational deliberation of political representatives, such as state 
diplomacy (Mitzen 2005), the United Nations Organisation (Lynch 2000), 
the “strong publics” of the European Parliament and the European Union 
Committee (Eriksenn and Fossum 2001: n.p.). These authors argue that 
rational deliberation of public powers is a sufficient characterisation of the 
transnational public sphere (Lynch 2000, Mitzen 2005) and transnational 
publics (Eriksenn and Fossum 2001). 
The ideas of the transnational “strong publics” reflect a broader, ongoing 
process of change in theoretical thought on the public, under the heading 
of deliberative democracy theories, in which the focus has been much 
more on rational deliberation than on inclusion (e.g. Habermas 1996, 
Gutmann and Thompson 1996, Bohman and Rehg 1997). The concept 
of “strong publics” was introduced by Fraser (1992: 134), who criticised 
Habermas’s early conception of the public for promoting weak publics 
whose deliberative practices function as a critical discursive check on the 
state, and consist exclusively of opinion formation but do not encompass 
decision-making. Fraser provides an example of direct decision-making 
processes as they happen in parliaments, where both opinion formation 
and decision-making are present. Paradoxically, in contrast to her own 
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argument, which stresses that there should be as much inclusion as possible 
in decision-making processes, she terms the national parliaments as 
“strong publics” (Fraser 1992: 134). By doing so she creates a rupture in the 
critical tradition of theoretical thought on the public, whereby the public is 
conceptualised as sovereign over its public officials (Dewey 1927/1954), is 
autonomous from the public authorities it supervises (Bentham 1791/1843) 
and stands in opposition to institutional authority, which in turn does not 
penetrate the public with its sanctions and controls (Mills 1956). 
In his later writings, Habermas (1996: 307) followed Fraser’s concept of 
“strong publics” and thus created a definition of the public in which rational 
deliberation and not autonomy and democratic inclusion became the 
most important defining concept of the public. Habermas argues for a 
distinction to be drawn between the “weak public sphere”, the sphere 
of opinion formation that is relieved of the need to achieve collectively 
binding decisions, and the “strong public sphere” of the political system. 
Yet the public, in its normative, classical understanding, is not “weak” – it 
is necessarily sovereign over its political representatives. By arguing for the 
distinction as a positive description of reality, Habermas himself retreats 
from the democratic ideals of combating political exclusion, as presented 
in his early work Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere (Habermas 
1962/1998). 
Writings that equate global governance to the transnational public 
sphere reflect this shift in theoretical thought on the public. Lynch (2000), 
for example, argues that since the public sphere exists when action is 
co-ordinated through a discourse focused on securing consensus, the 
international public sphere exists when states exchange interpretations and 
arguments in pursuit of international consensus. By applying Habermas’s 
(1981/1984: 284) distinction between communicative and strategic action, 
Lynch (2000: 317) thus sees the international public sphere developing 
in state diplomacy. If diplomacy as practised by the representatives of 
states is characterised by deliberation and communicative action and 
not the strategic pursuit of pre-defined interests, then this is, according to 
Lynch, the international public sphere. Similarly, Mitzen (2005: 402) borrows 
Habermas’s (1996: 307) distinction between “publics of parliamentary 
bodies” and the “weak public”. She proposes that governmental 
organisations and forms of deliberation between states are international 
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public spheres. Eriksenn and Fossum (2001: n.p.) argue that the European 
Parliament should be considered a “strong international public”, since 
parliaments are decision-making deliberative bodies: “They embody this 
combination better and more explicitly than any other political body: 
they are quintessential strong publics” (Eriksenn and Fossum 2001: n.p.). 
Similarly, the committees of the European Union could also be regarded 
as the strong publics Eriksenn and Fossum (2001: n.p.) propose, since they 
deliberate and make decisions which influence EU states.
Yet even if the decision-making of global governance were genuinely to 
follow the ideal deliberative process, this would still not make it the equal 
of the transnational public, since the deliberations of transnational political 
actors are exclusive in nature. International bodies such as the European 
Commission and the committees of the European Union are precisely the 
types of bodies that need to be confronted by a transnational public, not 
presented as equal to it. Describing the deliberative processes of political 
authorities as “publics” inevitably adds to the confusion surrounding 
questions of the autonomy, efficiency and accountability of government 
in relation to the public.
Transnational deliberative consultations: lack of 
inclusion and autonomy
Global governance is said to be equal to the transnational public sphere when 
it involves top-down organised deliberative consultations, such as “discursive 
designs” (Dryzek 1990), “stakeholder democracy” (Backstränd 2006: 472) 
and “deliberative participatory publics” (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 315). Dryzek 
(1990: 106) argues that, at the international level, discursive designs promise 
authority based on consent and voluntary compliance and, as such, are 
ideally suited to the highly decentralised international system. Keane (2009: 
695-747) optimistically argues that deliberative public consultations, together 
with the spread of a culture of voting, have become a new mode of “monitory 
democracy” – that since 1945 the world is in the form of the “deepest and 
widest system of democracy ever known” (Keane 2009: 698). 
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Nanz and Steffek propose that global governance should be accompanied 
by “deliberative participatory publics” which “stimulate an exchange of 
arguments in which policy choices are exposed to public scrutiny” (2004: 
315). According to Nanz and Steffek the “appropriate public sphere” of 
global governance is the “institutionalized arena for deliberative political 
participation beyond the limits of national boundaries” (2004: 315). Such 
a global governance regime would, they argue, draw its legitimacy 
from the “deliberative quality of their decision-making process: it is not 
designed to aggregate self-interests, but rather to foster mutual learning, 
and to eventually transform preferences while converging on a policy 
choice oriented towards the public interest” (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 
319). Such international deliberative forums would involve a variety of 
actors (e.g. national officials, scientific experts, NGOs) and cooperatively 
address a specific global problem. The main public actors would be the 
organised civil society organisations, who “can give voice to citizens’ 
concerns and channel them into the deliberative process of international 
organizations” and “can make the internal decision-making processes of 
international organizations more transparent to the wider public” (Nanz 
and Steffek 2004: 323). Deliberative public consultations are therefore 
considered to be the most important democratic innovation involved in 
global governance, since they follow deliberative principles and include 
a wide variety of stakeholders.
Eckersley (2007) positions the transnational public sphere within global 
governance institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The 
WTO, according to Eckersley (2007: 331), represents a step in the direction 
of the transnational public sphere, since it includes a mechanism, “amicus 
curiae brief”,  by which “non-state actors have found a new space for the 
display of ‘critical public reason’ within the organs of the WTO” (Eckersley 
2007: 331). He takes a positive view of this mechanism as a link between 
civil society and decision-makers. 
Similarly, Bäckstrand (2006: 427) argues for more diverse and hybrid 
forms of inclusion of a wider range of stakeholder interests in deliberative 
procedures, both at the level of policy decision-making (through advisory, 
top-down initiated and organised multi-stakeholder deliberations) and at 
the level of policy implementation (in the form of partnerships between 
governmental, private and non-governmental organisations).
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The example of good practice that she provides is the 2002 United Nations 
World Summit on Sustainable Development.
Compared to the discourse on strong publics, the idea of transnational 
deliberative designs is a step closer to democratisation: it argues for greater 
inclusion of civic voices. On the other hand, compared to the classic ideal 
of the public as being autonomous from political and economic powers 
(e.g. Bentham 1791/1843, Dewey 1927/1954, Mills 1956), the proposals 
on discursive public consultations neglect the question of autonomy in 
relation to top-down organisation. These proposals explicitly assume that 
public authorities will organise and finance transnational deliberative 
consultations. Yet such top-down organisation is problematic, since it does 
not guarantee the autonomy, inclusion, transparency and effectiveness 
of public deliberation, but directly serves the interests of political (and 
economic) “sponsors”. The most serious danger inherent in top-down 
organised discursive designs may be, as Dryzek (1996: 42) recognises, 
the co-opting of potential troublemakers and the use of those designs 
to justify decisions already made. To illustrate: the common conclusion of 
research on e-government public consultations carried out by means of 
new media has usually been that the main problem lies not in technologies 
but political representatives’ lack of will to listen (e.g. Jankowski and van 
Selm 2000: 158, Stanley and Weare 2004: 511,  Hyeon-Suk 2008: 55-57).
An argument against the comparison of the WTO’s public consultations 
with the transnational public sphere is provided by Young (2001). In 
response to the criticism of the WTO as an exclusive forum dominated 
by corporate interests in the service of northern hemisphere economies, 
some of its officials, Young (2001: 680-681) reports, organised a meeting 
for the day before the official WTO meeting, to which representatives of 
non-governmental organisations were invited. Many protesters, Young 
claims, considered this gesture an absurd attempt to co-opt and dampen 
opposition to the WTO’s proceedings, and therefore chose not to attend. 
Some of the NGO representatives who decided to attend, however, found 
the agenda already decided and that they were passively listening to 
the WTO director-general, the US political authorities and other powerful 
figures, with only minimal time available to question their speeches or 
make speeches of their own. 
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A similar critique can be applied to Bäckstrand’s (2006) suggestion that 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development is a model of good 
practice for the transnational public sphere. Inclusion in the World Summit 
was decided on by the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, 
who picked “focal organisations”, those whom it regarded as “obvious 
leaders” among the nine major groups (Bäckstrand 2006: 485): business, 
farmers, indigenous people, local governments, non-governmental 
organisations, the science and technology community, trade unions, 
women and youth. Bäckstrand does not question this decision, neither 
regarding the nine groups, nor regarding the “obvious leaders”, but 
merely assumes it to be a good example of inclusion on the transnational 
level. Regarding the nine groups selected, Willetts (2001: n.p.) claims that 
the choice of these groups was the arbitrary and incoherent outcome 
of negotiations at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development. He argues that it is arbitrary since it singles out women 
but not men; the young but not the elderly; indigenous people but not 
other minorities etc., but he stresses that, above all, “it is analytically 
inconsistent to have NGOs as one of the nine major groups, when all other 
eight are represented in the UN system via the ECOSOC arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organisations” (Willetts 2001: n.p.). He 
claims that the selection was influenced by the personal concerns of the 
secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development and by the lobbying of NGOs who were accredited to the 
conference. According to Willetts, this incoherence came about because 
many of those in the other “major groups” participating did not wish to be 
labelled as NGOs and that by adding NGOs they met the requirement 
to have a special category which would encompass environmental and 
development NGOs. 
How the process of inclusion to the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development operated was that “the CSD Commission on Sustainable 
Development Secretariat picks focal organizations, i.e. those whom it 
regards as obvious leaders among the major groups. Hence, the secretariat 
coordinates the dialogue process by identifying core organizing partners” 
(Bäckstrand 2006: 485). Bäckstrand (2006: 485) takes a positive view of 
the decision to include “obvious leaders” in the World Summit as a 
“bottom-up activity”. The criterion of “obvious leadership” is, however, far 
from “obvious”, since it could be interpreted in line with a large number 
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of different criteria (e.g. the number of members, access to the mass 
media agenda, the duration of existence, etc.). These criteria relate to 
differences in resources much more than to differences in legitimate 
representation. Various groups, for example, do not necessarily even have 
a specific leadership and work much more like a network among which 
there is cooperation and competition to secure a voice within the global 
governance system. Furthermore, the top-down selection of participants 
could hardly be named a “bottom-up process”. 
Yet another critical conclusion regarding a transnational deliberative 
design is provided by Cammaerts and Carpentier (2006) and Hintz (2007), 
who analysed inclusion in the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS). 
They concluded that accreditation for the WSIS process was geared 
towards large NGOs – applicants either needed to be an entity officially 
recognised by the UN, or they had to prove their credentials as formally 
established organisations with a headquarters, a democratically adopted 
constitution and annual reports (Hintz 2007: 4). Access for poorer countries 
and smaller NGOs was restricted due to the unequal distribution of 
resources (Hintz 2007: 4). Most importantly, some groups, such as Reporters 
Without Borders and Human Rights in China, were strategically excluded 
(serving the interests of powerful states) without any official explanation 
of why they were excluded. Similar measures were also put in place in 
respect of the opportunity to publish on the WSIS website (Cammaerts 
and Carpentier 2006: 30-31). 
These analyses thus show that existing examples of transnational 
deliberative public consultations have fared badly in terms of autonomy 
and inclusion. As Young argues, participation in exclusive systems merely 
helps confer undeserved legitimacy on these processes and offers no 
representation to those who remain outsiders (Young 2001: 680). Merely 
thinking about financial support for non-governmental organisations from 
“developing” countries (e.g. Nanz and Steffek 2004: 335) is not enough. As 
long as there is no vibrant transnational public autonomous from political 
and economic powers, there is no legitimate way to extend inclusion in 
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Stakeholders are not equal to the public
New actors, loosely labelled as “stakeholders”, are said to gain power as 
part of global governance processes. The United Nations Commission on 
Global Governance, for example, identifies four types of actors of global 
governance, in addition to national governments: “non-governmental 
organizations, citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the 
global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of 
dramatically enlarged influence” (Report of the Commission on Global 
Governance 1995: n.p.). Rosenau claims that, in the process of global 
governance, authority is relocated from the nation-state “upwards 
to transnational and supranational organisations, sidewards to social 
movements and NGOs, and downwards to subnational groups” (Rosenau 
1999: 293). The concept of global governance thus seems to describe 
a reality in which the regulation of public affairs has become more 
democratic, since new voices are said to have been empowered within 
the international arena: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens’ 
movements, multinational corporations and private firms. 
The main “break” that the notion of global governance represents with the 
Westphalian model for the regulation of transnational affairs is a critique 
of state-centrism. According to Rosenau (2002: 71), global governance 
neither posits a highest authority nor anticipates that one is likely to arise. 
“Global governance is a summarising phrase for all the sites in the world 
where efforts to exercise authority are undertaken” (Rosenau 2002: 71). It is 
“governance without government” (Rosenau and Cziempiel 1992/1998).
Dewey’s classical understanding (1927/1954) of the public as all those 
affected by indirect transactions to such an extent that it is deemed 
necessary to systematically regulate those consequences has been 
replaced within the discourse on governance by the concept of 
stakeholders. The term stakeholder is “imported” from management 
theories and theories of corporate responsibility to thoughts on globalisation 
(e.g. Jones and Fleming 2003), global sustainability (e.g. Steurer et al. 2005, 
Sharma and Henriques 2004, Pratt 2003), global stakeholder democracy 
(e.g Backstränd 2006, MacDonald 2008) and “multistakeholder networks” 
(Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 129). Although the stakeholder 
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concept appears to be similar to Dewey’s understanding of the public, 
it is, nevertheless, different in an important way: the main subjects in the 
public are individuals and not corporations. Economic stakeholders’ 
theory has been, “released from the burdens” that the concept of the 
public encompasses, inherently associated with democratic ideals. 
Freeman, who introduced the concept of stakeholders in economic 
management, defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” 
(Freeman 1984: 46 in Werhane and Freeman 2006: 502). In contrast to 
Dewey’s position on the public as those affected by public transactions, 
Freeman takes into account not the moral definition of the public (as all 
those who are affected), but the position of power: all those who can 
affect the organisation’s objectives. Freeman’s understanding leaves 
enough space for an interpretation which argues that managers should 
be responsible – but only to those who have enough power to affect the 
outcome of their outputs. The emphasis on stakeholders as those who 
have the means to influence the organisation is, for example, clear from 
Clarkson’s (1995: 106) differentiation between primary and secondary 
stakeholders. Judged from this perspective, the corporation should take 
into account stakeholders' claims only if they are primary stakeholders 
– if they manage to organize themselves in such a way to threat with 
potentially “significant damage to the corporation” (Clarkson 1995: 107). 
While there is no risk of pressure, there seems to be no responsibility for the 
corporation either. 
Furthermore, management stakeholder theory is “manager-centric”. 
While the concept of the public emphasises democratic decision-
making, the concept of stakeholders emphasises managers' decision-
making. For Dewey (1927/1954), those who are seriously affected in the 
long term by the issue in question identify themselves as the public, while 
the stakeholders, on the other hand, are identified by those who affect 
(i.e. managers) and not those who are affected by their transactions. 
Mitchell et al.  (1997), for example, identify stakeholders on the basis of 
the priority given to different groups by managers who take into account 
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Dewey’s focus was on final regulation by political authority (the state). 
The focus of stakeholder theory is on self-regulation between corporations 
and their social environment. Steurer et al. (2005: 264) argue that 
stakeholder theory gained momentum because relationships between 
corporations and societal groups are less likely to be the subject of active 
state interventionism than they were in the Keynesian era. According 
to Freeman, “creating value for stakeholders is important, if for no other 
reason than to avoid the folly of regulation and government expropriation” 
(Freeman et al. 2004: 366). 
Finally, the concept of the stakeholder is “based on the idea that sustaining 
viable stakeholder-relations creates long lasting value for corporations” 
(The Global Stakeholder Strategies Program4 2009). As LaPlume et al. 
(2008: 1158) note, Freeman’s approach was “unabashedly strategic in 
content because the consideration of stakeholder interests was seen as 
playing an instrumental role in enhancing firm performance”.  According 
to Jones and Fleming (2003: 434), stakeholder theory promotes, at best, 
more “enlightened” behaviour by firms (and other actors), but behaviour 
that remains fundamentally self-seeking. 
Business ethics theories, according to Crane et al. (2004: 108), have 
successfully promoted the idea that corporations are citizens. Discussion 
of stakeholders and corporate responsibility is, according to Banerjee 
(2008: 51), an ideological movement that is intended to legitimise and 
consolidate the power of large corporations in global governance 
processes. Economic actors have been one of the loudest voices arguing 
for “global stakeholder democracy”, since they present themselves as 
important stakeholders of global governance. The “multistakeholder 
networks” proposed by Held and Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 130-131) 
and Benner et al. (2004) argue for the inclusion of corporations. In 
the last decade, powerful economic players have gained a seat in 
global governance procedures, especially within the United Nations 
Organisation’s conferences. To illustrate: the United Nations Global 
Compact has been proposed as a model of good practice for “harnessing 
corporate power” (Kuper 2004; Risse 2004; Zadek 2004). Similarly, at the 
World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), according to Hintz (2007: 
5), corporations were represented both individually and through their 
respective business associations.
4 http://www.business.gwu.edu/icr/global_stakeholder_strategies.asp, accessed 14 October 2009. 
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The transnational consequences of economic actors, such as the 
externalisation of costs (Wallerstein 2004: 47-48; 81), tax evasion (Burbach et 
al. 1996: 60, Sassen 1996: 8, Scholte 2005: 138), and evasion of responsibility 
by creating global “flexible accumulation” (Harvey 1989: 141-173), 
emphasise the need for a transnational public to emerge in response to 
economic actors. The reality, on the other hand, is that economic power 
provides resources which allow economic actors to be the most organised 
and “loudest” actors within existing global governance processes. The 
economic actors who have pushed for the economic globalisation that 
we know today are the same actors who push for representation as 
stakeholders in global governance. 
Effectiveness does not compensate for inclusiveness
Global governance “multisectoral networks” have developed, Benner et 
al. (2004: 192) argue, “in response to the failure of traditional governance 
mechanisms, and offered new and alternative ways of getting things done”. 
“Getting things done” is the implicit argument within conceptualisation of 
global governance as self-regulation of economic actors (e.g. Adobor & 
McMullen 2013), whereby those affected by self-regulation are understood 
to be only or primarily corporations. The main challenge for such economic 
global non-governmental regimes is according to Adobor and McMullen 
(2013: 11) their effectiveness while public inclusion is narrowed only to 
transparency by publicizing data on their operations. 
The notion of global governance is implicitly interconnected with the idea 
that the effectiveness of regulation, not democratic inclusion, is the most 
important value of transnational organisation. Backstränd (2006: 473) 
identifies two types of legitimacy: “input” and “output” legitimacy. The 
first refers to inclusion in decision-making processes: it is “the participatory 
quality of the decision-making process and asks whether the process 
conforms to procedural demands, such as representation of relevant 
stakeholders, transparency and accountability” (Backstränd 2006: 473). 
The second refers to the effectiveness of the problem-solving capacity of 
the governance system (Backstränd 2006: 473).
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Backstränd (2006: 473) proposes that “high output legitimacy in terms 
of effective collective problem solving can, on some accounts, 
compensate for low input legitimacy”, or, in other words, she claims that 
the effectiveness of problem-solving can compensate for inclusiveness. 
Such negation of legitimacy in terms of democratic inclusion is very 
much in line with the overall neo-liberal approach to global governance, 
what Higgot and Erman (2008: 5) term the “economic theory of global 
governance”. This approach promotes “output legitimacy” by means 
of “public-private partnerships” beyond public oversight, such as the 
examples of credit rating agencies and ICANN. 
Effectiveness, however, can never compensate for legitimacy. The criteria 
of what is effective need to be set by the “input legitimacy” of all those 
potentially affected – those who are potentially affected by the issue at 
hand know their problems best and can therefore be the final judge on 
whether a specific problem has been solved effectively. However, the 
actors who constitute the broad arena of global governance are not 
democratically selected, nor are their operations transparent. Furthermore, 
they are not held accountable by the people whose lives they affect (e.g. 
Benner et al. 2004; Scholte 2004; Bexell et al. 2006; Gupta 2008).
Splichal (2010) argues that global governance is characterised by a global 
democratic deficit, because new forms of governance often escape 
traditional mechanisms of accountability, while the new accountability 
mechanisms lack efficiency. In a democratic nation-state, civil society 
and the economy are regarded as spheres outside the political system, 
having the potential to influence the state, but not to be involved in 
governance. The notion of governance, however, blurs this differentiation 
between the state, economy and civil society (Splichal 2007: n.p.) and 
thus also the notion of accountability and legitimacy of representation. 
It results in a situation in which it is “extremely difficult if not impossible to 
know who decides what, and how it is decided” (Splichal 2009: 396).
Consider, for example, the European Union. Starting out as an organisation 
for economic regulation, it has become an important regional actor 
entrusted with powers to deliver political regulation of much more than just 
economic transactions. EU nation-states have transferred their regulatory 
powers and re-delegated their sovereignty to the political bodies of the 
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EU in the process of denationalisation.  The EU is criticised on account of its 
democratic deficit, most commonly for a lack of democratic mechanisms 
within the EU (Rumford 2003: 34) and thus a shortage of opportunities for 
its citizens to influence its decisions. As long as decisions within the EU are 
reached by experts who are not accountable to elected representatives, 
and the decision-making process has little transparency (e.g. Krašovec 
2006), denationalisation within the EU will equate to depoliticisation (Hay 
2007). In the face of such criticism, the EU has responded with highly public 
attempts to construct a European public sphere as a top-down process 
(e.g. Brüggemann 2005; Baisnée 2007). In 2001, the Commission of the 
European Communities issued a White Paper on European Governance, 
in which it argued for greater involvement and more openness with 
regional and local governments and civil society. Yet, as Höreth concludes 
in his analysis of the White Paper, this is not a means to reduce the EU 
democratic deficit, since the White Paper represents the expert-driven 
approach, where “participation and consultation can only be initiated 
and controlled by the institutions, should lead to enhanced governance 
capability, are limited to consultation and mainly directed to sectoral 
functional actors” (Höreth 2000: 13).
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Conclusion
In what she terms “activists challenges to deliberative democracy”, Young 
(2001: 688) provides an important guideline for modern democratic theory: 
it should keep a distance from democratic practices in existing structural 
circumstances and should understand itself primarily as a critical theory, 
which exposes the exclusions and constraints in supposed fair processes 
of actual decision making, which make the legitimacy of their conclusions 
suspect. The main thread that was guiding the analysis presented here was 
the critical stance that democratic theory should refrain from loosening 
the rules of classical democratic ideals, such as the public, but to defend 
them even more rigorously. Having such a critical stance in mind, we 
have drawn here upon the classic ideal of the transnational public as 
democratically inclusive and autonomous from political and economic 
power (e.g. Bentham 1791/1943; Dewey 1927/1954; Mills 1956). 
If we are serious about democracy at the international and transnational 
level then one of the first steps towards this ideal is establishing clear 
conceptual differences in theories on transnational regulation, where 
global governance, stakeholders and the public are not concepts used as 
synonyms, nor are they used as concepts that freely overlap. Each of these 
three concepts has its own historical roots and with that not only explicit but 
also implicit meaning. In this sense the article is meant as a revitalisation of 
the “old” concept of the public since it normatively provides an important, 
albeit highly normative, “benchmark” for evaluation of democratic nature 
of global governance, both on a conceptual level, as was analysed here, 
and on an empirical level – which is left for future research.
At the policy level the main proposal taken from this paper would be 
that the term “the public” needs to be reinvigorated in policy discourse, 
both at the national and the transantional level – it has been all too easy 
to substitute it with the term “stakeholders” and thus with the economic 
“neospeak”. The term “stakeholders” has been employed in order to 
legitimise and consolidate the power of large corporations in global 
governance processes. Instead of supporting those who are affected by 
the transactions with grave and long term transnational consequences, 
the process of global governance – under the heading of stakeholders 
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– includes the perpetrators of such transactions in whose interests it is to 
oppose the transnational regulation of their activities.
The second conclusion for the policy level is the question of autonomy 
in relation to top-down organisation. Most global governance proposals 
assume that public authorities will organise and finance transnational 
deliberative consultations. Such top-down organisation is problematic, 
since it does not guarantee the autonomy, inclusion, transparency and 
effectiveness of public deliberation, but is prone to directly serve the 
interests of political (and economic) “sponsors” – as critical analyses of 
existing consultations have shown (e.g. Young 2001, Cammaerts and 
Carpentier 2006; Hintz 2007). The ideal of the public is that the public, 
whether transnational or national, becomes aware of the issues that 
affect it and starts to organise itself around these issues. In policy terms 
this means that the information structures for transnational publics to be 
informed, to organise and to communicate, need to be supported. At 
the national level these ideals were traditionally seen to be safeguarded 
by national public media. Similarly, if any talk about global governance is 
to be taken seriously in terms of its democratic potential, it should first be 
accompanied by talk about transnational public media. 
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